Principals often operate on the basis of misspeci…ed models of their agents' preferences. We show that even slight misspeci…cation can lead to large and non-vanishing losses. Instead we propose a two-step scheme, whereby: (i) the principal identi…es the model-optimal menu; (ii) modi…es prices by o¤ering to share with the agent a …xed proportion of the pro…t she would receive if this item was sold at the model-optimal price. We show that her loss is bounded and vanishes smoothly as the model converges to the truth. Finally, two-step mechanisms without a sharing rule like (ii) will not yield a valid approximation.
Introduction
As George Box famously put it, "Remember that all models are wrong; the practical question is how wrong do they have to be to not be useful." In agency theory, a principal is assumed to operate on the basis of the agent's preferences. Her model will however, at best, be an approximation of the truth. Hence she may not be able to design the truly optimal contract. How should a principal who knows that her model is potentially misspeci…ed act in such a circumstance?
In such a context -following March and Simon's (1958) classic approach to organizational decision making -one can ask two related questions. Can the principal …nd a solution that achieves an acceptable payo¤ even if her model turns out to be wrong? How will such a contract di¤er from the contract she would o¤er if her model was exactly true?
Our paper attempts to answer these questions in the context of one of the classic problems of all of microeconomics: single-agent mechanism design with quasi-linear preferences. This model -commonly referred to as the 'screening problem'-has found various key economic applications from regulation and taxation and to labor markets, insurance and incentive design. In its classic interpretation of nonlinear pricing, a multi-product monopolist o¤ers a menu of product-price speci…cations to a buyer or a continuum of buyers (e.g. Wilson 1993 ).
In the standard formulation, the principal knows the true distribution of the agent's preferences. In this paper, we re-visit the general screening problem, but instead assume that the principal (seller) does not know the true distribution of the agent's (buyers') preferences. The principal faces model uncertainty and has access only to a model that is potentially misspeci…ed. The seller knows that her model is potentially wrong -for example because it is typically simpler than reality -and she has a sense -to be formalized shortly -of how much her model varies from the buyers'true preferences. Can such a principal guarantee herself an outcome that is not much worse than what she could expect had she access to the true preferences of the agent?
For instance, the agent's preferences may depend on his physical location. While geography may a¤ect preferences continuously, data often comes in a discretized form: the seller may know roughly how many people live in a certain zip code area, but not their exact location or the exact way location a¤ects preferences. Of course, she could assume an arbitrary continuous distribution, speci…c to each zip code area and a speci…c utility function. However, the seller could instead be interested in …nding a contract that achieves robust performance given any possible within-area distributions.
As another example of model uncertainty, consider a situation where the agent's willingness-to-pay for an object depends on a list of attributes: income, age, location, etc. This list may be long though, and the principal may operate on the basis of a model that explicitly included the e¤ect of the most important factors, but left some characteristics unmodeled or modeled only in an approximate way. In this instance, she wishes to design a mechanism using her model that is robust to misspeci…cations of the minor attributes.
Our paper shows two results, a negative and a positive one. On the negative side, we show that designing a contract as if the principal's misspeci…ed model was correct leads to potentially large losses, and these losses do not vanish even as the model gets arbitrarily close to the truth. As a consequence, even a small degree of misspeci…cation can cause largely suboptimal outcomes and cause a principal who ignores model uncertainty to be surprised by how badly her contract performs relative to what she could expect if her model was true. The positive result instead identi…es a simple two-step procedure that departs from the above naive solution in a systematic way and produces a valid approximation for a very large class of situations. In fact we show that any contract that will be robust to preference misspeci…cations must be similar to the contract identi…ed by this procedure. The rest of this section summarizes these two results in informal terms.
Outside of the problem of model uncertainty, even if the principal had access to a correct model of the agent's behavior, when taking all factors into account, the correct solution of the screening problem might be prohibitively di¢ cult. Indeed Conitzer and Sandholm (Theorem 1, 2004) show that …nding an exact solution to the single-agent mechanism design problem we consider here is NP-complete. Our method o¤ers a smooth trade-o¤ between adopting a simpler representation and facing a tolerable loss relative to the optimal revenue, even in the large class of domains where naively relying on the simpler representation will lead to a great loss.
To introduce our results, we …rst have to discuss model misspeci…cation, and a way of measuring the quality of the principal's model. In our setup, the model is a …nite approximation of the agent's true preferences, hence every model type represents an uncountable set of possible true types. We de…ne the approximation index of a model to be the maximal distance -in terms of willingness to pay for any product -between any model type and any of the true types it represents, For any model and any value of the approximation index, there is a set of true preference pro…les whose maximal distance from the model is weakly less than the value we have chosen -where we will also allow for a probabilistic or local interpretation of this statement. In the geographical example a natural approximation index is given by the maximal preference distance between two types in any district and the set of possible agent preference pro…les includes all possible geographical distributions given the partition of agents into districts.
In March and Simon's spirit, the near-optimal contract we are seeking can rely only on the information available to the principal. The menu o¤ered to the agents will thus depend only on the principal's model and the approximation index, and no other information about the true types. For any true type space satisfying the approximation index bound, the approximation loss is given by the di¤erence between the pro…t that the principal would get if she optimized over the true type space and the pro…t she gets with the menu computed by the algorithm. A nearoptimal solution puts a bound on this approximation loss and guarantees that the bound vanishes as the approximation index goes to zero.
To introduce the negative result (Theorem 2), note that …nding a near-optimal solution given model uncertainty in our strategic setting poses a challenge that is absent in non-strategic environments. Even when all primitives are well-behaved, the fact that the agent best-responds to the menu o¤ered to him by the principal creates room for discontinuity: a small change in the menu might lead to a large change in the principal's expected payo¤. The discontinuity is heightened by two elements. First, in the exact solution of the screening problem the principal's payo¤ function is discontinuous exactly at the equilibrium allocation: this is because pro…t maximization implies a system of binding incentive-compatibility and participation constraints. Second, outside the narrow monotonic one-dimensional case, binding constraints may well be non-local (Wilson 1993 , Armstrong 1996 , Rochet and Choné 1998 , Armstrong and Rochet 1999 . This makes dealing with misspeci…-cation challenging: a small perturbation of a payo¤ type might lead to large changes in equilibrium choice behavior and a¤ect the principal's payo¤ discontinuously.
Our negative result examines the pro…t loss of a principal who behaves as if her model type space was correct. She simply computes the optimal menu given her model and o¤ers it to the agent. We show that, already when preference heterogeneity is two dimensional, the upper bound to the pro…t loss remains …nite even as the approximate index goes to zero. This means that a naive principal experiences a discontinuous loss when moving from the case where her model is exactly correct to the case where it is only almost correct. The result is proven by showing that there exists a broad class of screening problems in which the optimal solution involves binding nonlocal constraints for a positive measure of types. Here, as argued above, a small perturbation of payo¤ types creates large changes in equilibrium behavior and a large loss for the principal. We also provide a simple example of this situation in the paper (Section 3).
One might try to address our negative result by …nding su¢ ciently restrictive conditions that guarantee that only local incentive constraints bind. As argued above, this works well only when preference heterogeneity is one dimensional (e.g., Mussa and Rosen 1978), but not when preferences vary along multiple dimensions, and arguably "In most cases that we can think of, a multidimensional preference parameterization seems critical to capturing the basic economics of the environment" (Rochet and Stole, 2003) . 1 Our goal is not to identify a contract or a mechanism that works very well in one speci…c environment, but rather to …nd one that produces an acceptable outcome for a large class of screening problems given the model uncertainty faced by the principal -one that uses generic preferences, cost functions, and (potentially multi-dimensional) type spaces. This will then also help ensure that the contract will be robust to violations of exact preferences restrictions. The positive result (Theorem 1) identi…es an approximation scheme that works in any smooth type space. We call our solution concept a pro…t-participation mechanism. Given an approximate type space and its corresponding approximation index, we de…ne the pro…t-participation mechanism, based on two steps:
(i) The principal solves for the optimal menu, a vector of product-price pairs, based on the set of all feasible products as if the model type space was true.
(ii) The principal then takes the menu obtained in the …rst step, keeps the product vector unchanged and modi…es the price vector. In particular, our principal willingly o¤ers a discount on each product proportional to the pro…t she would get if that product was sold at the model-optimal price. The size of the absolute discount, which is determined by the mechanism, depends only on the approximation index, i.e., our measure of model uncertainty.
Theorem 1 studies the di¤erence between the expected pro…t (over the true type space) generated by the menu obtained by our pro…t-participation mechanism and the expected pro…t (over the true type space) generated by the menu that would be optimal given the true type space -as the agent's preferences are potentially misspeci…ed, both these expected pro…ts are unknown. We are nevertheless able to prove the existence of an upper bound to this di¤erence and show that this upper bound is a smooth function of the approximation index. Furthermore, for any screening problem, the upper bound vanishes smoothly as the approximation index goes to zero.
Pro…t participation yields a near-optimal solution in the presence of model uncertainty because it addresses the violation of optimally binding non-local incentive constraints. By willingly o¤ering a pro…t-related discount, the principal makes the agent a shared residual claimants of her model pro…t. This guarantees that allocations that yield more pro…t in the menu that is optimal given the model types become relatively more attractive for the agent. Now, a true type that is close to a model type may still not choose the product that is meant for that model type. Even if he chooses a di¤erent product from the modi…ed menu, this must now be one that would have yielded an approximately higher pro…t in the original menu -the di¤erence in the principal's pro…t is bounded by a constant that is strictly decreasing in the discount.
While a pro…t-related discount is bene…cial because it puts an upper bound to the pro…t loss due to the discrepancy between the choice of a true type and a model type, it also has a cost in terms of lower sale prices. The discount rate used in the pro…t-participation mechanism strikes an optimal balance between this cost and the above described bene…t. We show that as the approximation index decreases, a given upper bound to the pro…t loss can be achieved with a lower discount, and as the model tends to the truth, the optimal discount goes to zero as well.
One may wonder whether there are other ways of achieving a valid approximation besides the one we propose. We show that pro…t-sharing is a necessary feature of any valid approximation scheme within a large class of mechanisms. Our negative result (Theorem 2) does not just cover the naive mechanism mentioned earlier. It applies to any model-based mechanism, namely any scheme that begins with step (i) of the pro…t-participation mechanism. In other words it applies to all algorithms that can modify model-optimal prices according to any rule. Such modi…cation includes the naive mechanism discussed above -in which the model-optimal price vector is left unchanged -as well as any scheme based on price manipulation.
Theorem 2 proves that, if preference heterogeneity is multi-dimensional, then any model-based mechanism which violates a pro…t-participation condition cannot be a valid approximation: the upper bound to the pro…t loss does not vanish as the approximation index goes to zero. This means that if there are model-based mechanisms that do at least as well as the pro…t-participation mechanism, they must be similar in spirit to the one we propose, in that they contain an element of pro…t participation.
The economic insight from our result is that approximate models can play a useful role in general contracting environments as long as the risk of misspeci…cation is dealt with in an appropriate manner. A principal who has only an imperfect model of the agent's behavior can start by taking her simpler model at face value and …nd its optimal solution. However, the resulting allocation is not robust to model misspeci…cation. To make sure that small errors in the model do not lead to serious pro…t losses, the principal must act 'magnanimously'. She needs to make the agent the joint residual claimant on part of her pro…t that she would make if her model was true. Such apparent generosity takes the form of a discount that should be greater for more lucrative products. The comparative statics implication of our results (Corollary 1) is that, as the principal's model of the agent preferences becomes less accurate, the principal needs to price products in a more magnanimous way.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the screening problem and de…nes the notion of an approximate type space. Section 3 provides a simple example, where the type of the agent corresponds to his geographical location, to illustrate the logic behind our two results. For exposition reasons, we report …rst the positive result and then the negative result. This is because the latter not only includes the 'naive'mechanism, but all mechanisms that do not use pro…t sharing, and hence is best discussed after introducing our positive result. Therefore, Section 4 discusses the positive result: we develop Pro…t-Participation Pricing and establish an approximation bound (Lemma 1), we show the positive result of the paper, namely that the pro…t-participation mechanism is a valid approximation scheme (Theorem 1) given model uncertainty, and we discuss comparative statics (Corollary 1). Section 5 shows that model-based mechanisms are valid approximation schemes only if they contain an element of pro…t participation (Theorem 2). Section 6 concludes.
Literature
To the best of our knowledge, this is the …rst paper to discuss near-optimal screening when the principal faces model uncertainty and uses a misspeci…ed type space.
There is of course a large body of work on approximation in single-agent problems in many disciplines including economics. However, as mentioned earlier, our set-up presents a form of discontinuity that is due to the strategic interaction between the principal and the agent. The agent's payo¤ in our model is always continuous in the agent's type, as the Theorem of the Maximum predicts (Ausubel and Deneckere 1993). It is the principal's payo¤ that may be discontinuous because of the misspeci…ed response of the agent. As our example in Section 4.3 illustrates, this discontinuity exists even when the agent's utility is continuous in allocation and type. 2 Near optimal nonlinear pricing was …rst analyzed by Wilson (1993, section 8.3) , who discusses the approximate optimality of multi-part tari¤s (with a onedimensional type). The closest work in terms of approximation in mechanism design is Armstrong (1999) , who studies near-optimal nonlinear tari¤s for a monopolist as the number of products goes to in…nity, under the assumption that the agent's utility is additively separable across products. He shows that the optimal mechanism can be approximated by a simple menu of two-part tari¤s, in each of which prices are proportional to marginal costs (if agent's preferences are uncorrelated across products, the mechanism is even simpler: a single cost-based two-part tari¤). There are a number of key di¤erences between our approach and Armstrong's. Perhaps, the most important one is that his approximation moves from a simpli…cation of the contract space while we operate on the type space. 3 Independent work by Chassang (2011) studies approximately optimal contracts in a dynamic delegated investment problem with moral hazard, adverse selection, and a limited liability constraint on both principal and agent. The paper identi…es a class of calibrated contracts that perform approximately as well as a linear bench- 2 For an analysis of strategic approximation in games with symmetric information, see Reny (2012) . 3 See also Chu, Leslie, and Sorensen (2010) for a theoretical and empirical analysis of this problem. A growing literature at the intersection of computer science and economics studies near-optimal mechanisms under computational complexity (e.g., Conitzer and Sandholm 2004) or communication complexity (e.g., Nisan and Segal 2006) . However, the focus is on designers who face restrictions on the space of mechanisms rather than model uncertainty. mark contract with a number of attractive properties. The performance bound is independent of the underlying process for returns. While our two papers apply to di¤erent environment and use di¤erent approaches, they both include the feature that the principal shares part of her pro…t with the agent in a manner that is designed to correct for small but potentially damaging failures of benchmark incentive compatibility constraints. We suspect that this may be a general property of mechanisms that are near-optimal in a variety of environments.
The goal of our paper is also related to Gabaix (2010) . In that decision-theoretic framework, the agent operates on the basis of a "sparse" representation of the world. The objective is to …nd the optimal sparse model compatible with the limited cognitive skills of the decision-maker. Our paper does not endogenize the approximate type space; instead we focus on identifying and tackling the challenges to approximation that arise in strategic environments.
Setup
We begin by introducing the standard single-agent quasilinear mechanism design problem. Let Y be a compact set of available alternatives. The principal selects a subset of the set Y and assigns transfer prices p 2 R to each element of this subset. The resulting menu is thus a set of items, a set of alternative-price pairs. Let's denote a menu by M and assume that it always contains the outside option y 0 whose price p 0 is normalized to zero. Once a menu is o¤ered, the agent is asked to choose exactly one item from this menu.
The principal's pro…t is the transfer price net the cost of producing the object:
where the above speci…cation follows Rochet and Chone (1998) , and much of the literature on non-linear pricing, in that the principal's payo¤ does not directly depend on the agent's type. For any set of alternatives Y; the agent's preferences are described by two independently de…ned objects: the truth and the model. These two will be linked by an approximation index and they will give rise to the approximation problem we analyze.
Truth. The agent's true preferences depend on his private type t from set T < n -a compact and connected measurable set within a …nite dimensional Euclidean space -drawn from a probability distribution which has a continuous density function f (t). 4 In particular, the agent's payo¤ is his type-dependent valuation of the object y net the transfer price to the principal:
Thus the principal faces a single-agent mechanism design problem which -given a …xed (Y; c) -can be summarized by (T; v; f ):We refer to T and v (T v henceforth) as the true type space.
We assume that there is a …nite upper bound on the principal's pro…t
and denote the supremum of the principal's expected payo¤ over all feasible menus by (T v ; f ) : The principal's expected pro…t is then bounded from below by zero and above by max . We scale v ; c such that max is normalized to be 1.
Model. Our key point of departure is that the principal facing the above screening problem, does not have access to the truth. Instead, she is constrained to operate on the basis of a model that might systematically di¤er from the truth. The principal's model is a possibly incorrect representation of the agent's preferences. The model uses a discrete type set S where the preferences of a model type s 2 S of the agent, are given by u (s; y) p with associated probability distribution function g 2 S.
We refer to S and u (S u henceforth) as the model set or equivalently as the approximate type space: the principal's full model is denoted by (S u ; g). Note that the model can generically di¤er from the truth both in terms of type distribution and also in terms of the preferences. The preferences of the model types considered by the principal might not correspond to the preferences of any actual type from T:
Approximation Index. We now introduce a measure of the quality of the model, namely a distance between the model and the truth. This index describing how misspeci…ed the model is will satisfy two important conditions. First, it will be a simple scalar that re ‡ects some 'distance' between the model and the truth that goes to zero as the model tends to the truth. This corresponds to the minimal information that the principal can have about how misspeci…ed her model potentially is. Second, it will have a worst-case element, which will allow us to …nd upper bounds to the pro…t loss. This pessimistic nature of the measure guarantees that as our measure goes to zero any other non-worst case measure would go to zero too.
Given any truth (T v ; f ) and model (S u ; g) the corresponding true approximation index " true is de…ned as follows:
1. An approximation partition P is a …nite measurable partition of T with #S (possibly non-connected) cells J s , such that the probability mass of true types belonging to cell J s (computed according to density f ) equals the probability (according to g) of model type s. Let be the (obviously non-empty) set of all approximation partitions. 5 2. For each cell J s in an approximation partition P in , de…ne the upper bound to the maximal utility distance between any type and its associated model type as d s (P) = sup y sup t2Js ju(s; y) v(t; y)j and de…ne the upper bound for the whole partition as d (P) = max s2S d s (P).
3. The true approximation index of (
Note that " true exists and, given that S is …nite, it is strictly positive.
4. Let the approximation index " be any number strictly greater than " true . Also, de…ne an "-approximation partition as any approximation partition P with
There must exist at least one "-approximation partition: 6 Approximation Problem. In this setting, the principal knows the model and an approximation index " that re ‡ects model uncertainty. She does not know anything about the truth except that the distance between the truth and her model is not greater than ". The paper considers solutions that are based only on the cost function, the model, and the approximation index, namely (S u ; g; Y; c; ") but do not require any further information about the truth. The goal then is to put a bound on the payo¤ loss that the principal experiences because she uses the model rather than the truth. Namely, our goal is to obtain a solution that guarantees that, for any (T v ; f ) such that " true ", the di¤erence between the principal would receive under the truly optimal mechanism for (T v ; f ) and the payo¤ that the principal receives using a model-based algorithm in an environment in which the agent's true 5 Since f is absolutely continuous and T is Lebesgue measurable, it can be proven based on Lyapunov's original convexity theorem that such a partition always exists.
To sketch a proof, index the elements of S by i where i 2 f1; :::; #Sg. Take i = 1, since f is absolutely continuous and for all measurable J(s 1 ) T it follows that f (J(s 1 )) f (T ), it follows that we can always …nd a set J(s 1 ) T such f (J(s 1 )) = f S (s 1 ). See Theorem 2 of Ross (2005) for a proof. Since S is …nite, we can repeat this procedure and …nd J(s 2 ) in the domain T nJ(s 1 ) and thus proceed inductively. 6 If there exists a partition P , that attains inf P2 d (P), then we can also allow " = " true and P is an "-partition.
preferences are described by (T v ; f ) is bounded above by some function of ", with the property that the bound goes to zero as " ! 0. While this problem can be posed under speci…c distributional or functional assumptions, we are interested in …nding a solution that is informationally minimal and hence works for any environment de…ned above.
The analysis can be easily extended to situations where the principal is not fully certain that " true ". If the principal thinks that there is a small probability that " true > ", one can simply modify the upper bound to the loss by adding a worst-case scenario (a pro…t of zero) that occurs with probability . In the same spirit, one can extend the analysis to cases where the principal faces more local model uncertainty and hence her con…dence varies locally, allowing for di¤erent indices to apply to di¤erent regions of the preference space.
Discussion
Our principal is constrained to operate on a model rather than the truth, but she is willing to take a stand on the maximal payo¤ distance between her model and the truth. The principal does not know the truth (T v ; f ), but she knows that her representation, (S u ; g) is such that " true < ". The approximation index imposes an informationally minimal restrictions on what the true type space might be relative to the principal's model. For any given model, there is a potentially very large class of preference speci…cation and distributions over these (T v ; f ) such that they satisfy the approximation index, their " true < ":
Unlike the rest of the literature on approximation in mechanism design, our paper does not in any way restrict the set of contracts that the principal may use. What prevents the principal to achieve the optimal pro…t is purely model uncertainty.
Why does our principal use an approximate model rather than the truth? In many situations, it is unrealistic to assume that the principal can fully specify the underlying true distribution of preferences. Rather she operates under weaker epistemic conditions, like some non-probabilistic uncertainty (Walley 1991) or some coarser understanding of the agent's behavior. 7 She knows that her model may be wrong, but she does not know in which direction. She knows, however, an upper bound on how misspeci…ed her model might be, e.g., she knows an approximation index " . In other situations, the principal can improve the quality of her model but that comes at a cost. For instance, in the geographical model she could obtain the exact location of agents. Our result can help the principal decide whether to incur the additional cost: the upper bound on the pro…t loss provides a measure of the potential bene…t of learning the truth.
Example
We now introduce a class of examples to illustrate the potential problems that can arise when a principal utilizes a (slightly) mis-speci…ed model. and y (t) 6 = y (t 0 ) if t 6 = t 0 . Assume that w (t; y (t)) w (t) for all t. However, of course, it could be that w (t; y) < w (t) for other values of y.
A practical example of such a product might be a car. The consumer may need a car, any car, for a practical reason, captured by w (t). However, he may also have a taste for a particular model, maybe sports cars or 4x4s, so he is willing to pay v (y; t) > w (t) for certain subsets of y. The particular value y (t) represents the ideal car for consumer t.
The model type S is a discretized version of T . For simplicity assume that S is a regular grid and each model type s corresponds to the midpoint of a cell in the grid. Let " true be the maximal di¤erence v (t; y) v (s; y) whenever t belongs to the grid of s over all s 2 S.
We make an additional assumption: For every t and t
which has an intuitive interpretation: type t is willing to pay more that type t 0 to move from a product with no aesthetic value to the one preferred by t. This is reasonable as this is the product preferred by t, not t 0 .
For instance, this is satis…ed if v (y (t) ; t) = a k(y t)k and w (t) = b ktk where k k is the Euclidean distance, and we make the asumption that a b. That is because
due to the triangle inequality (kt t
While the modeler knows v for all values in T , the principal only knows v for values in S and has approximation index " (namely he knows that " true ").
The goal of this example is to show that if the principal solves the problem as if the model space was correct he incurs a large loss and that this loss does not vanish as " ! 0. We will do so by showing that the solution involves generic binding non-local constraints.
We begin by de…ning the lowest price the monopolist charge for any product that is o¤ered for sale:
The minimal price p min divides the type set S into three subsets:
Excluded types S 0 : those for whom w (s; y (s)) < p min :
We show that for types in S 2 the binding constraint is nonlocal. If there exists a solution where each type in S 1 is charged w (s; y (s)) and each type in S 2 is charged w (s; y (s)) w(s) + p min , that solution must be optimal because it is based on the maximal conceivable willingness-to-pay given p min . To see that this solution exists, assume that each type t in S 1 and S 2 is o¤ered his ideal product y (s) at price p(s) = w (s; y (s)) in S 1 and price p(s) = w (s; y (s)) w (s) + p min in S 2 . Inspect …rst the incentive-compatibility constraints for s in S 1 and S 2 are:
and they can be split into two sets of inequalities. The …rst set has the form
and it is satis…ed by de…nition because p min w (s) in S 1 and because of the de…nition of p (s) in S 2 . The second set of inequalities has the form:
in the case of S 1 , one can see the inequalities are satis…ed when p ( ) is replaced by its de…nition. In the case of S 2 , the second set of inequalities can be rewritten as
and it is thus satis…ed by assumption (1). This shows that for every p min there is an optimal solution where for every s 2 S 1 the binding constraint is the participation constraint and for every s 2 S 2 the binding contraint is the incentive compatibilty contraint with the lowest-priced product. Now consider what happens when the menu that is optimal for model type S is used for the true type T . Take a type t near s. If he chooses the product meant for s, namely y (s), he receives utility w (t; y (s)) p (s) but this is lower than the utility that comes from some other product (if s 2 S 2 ). instead of making a pro…t p(s) = w (s; y (s)) w (s) + p min , the principal makes only p min .
Note that simply providing a discount on all prices will not solve this problem because it will also reduce p min .
As we shall show in the rest of the paper, the logic of this simple example is general. An approximation scheme based on pro…t discounting always works (Theorem 1). No discounting or schemes that are not based on pro…t discounting will not work (Theorem 2).
Pro…t-Participation Mechanism
In this section, we show the positive result of our paper: we can always obtain a valid approximation if we use a pro…t-participation mechanism. As mentioned in the introduction, it is expositionally simpler to begin with the positive result, as our negative result discusses mechanisms that do not contain the pro…t-participation property that characterizes the positive result.
The section begins with an intermediate result (Lemma 1) on pro…t-participation discounting. We then prove the main result (Theorem 1) and we conclude with a brief mention of comparative statics.
Pro…t-Participation Pricing
In this section we introduce the key component of our solution method, Pro…t-Participation Pricing, and present an intermediate result that bounds the pro…t loss for the principal.
First, we de…ne a notion of expected pro…t that can be applied to both the truth and the model. Let us de…ne it for the model …rst. It is the expected pro…t that the principal would receive if her model was the true. Hold the set of products Y and the cost function c constant and, for any menu M = fy k ; p k g k and model (S u ; g), de…ne
where (y (s) ; p(y (s))) is the allocation selected by type s from M , which for any s 2 S is given by u (s; y (s)) p (y (s)) u (s; y) p(y) for all (y; p (y)) 2 M with the proviso that, whenever the agent is indi¤erent between two or more allocations, he chooses one that yields the highest pro…t to the principal. An identical de…nition holds for the truth, (allowing for the fact that f is a density rather than a function) where equivalently, (T v ; f; M ) denotes the expected pro…t that menu M will generate under the true type distribution. In words, using Pro…t-Participation Pricing the principal leaves the product component of a menu …xed, but she gives a speci…c pro…t-based discount on all products using a constant fraction. To highlight this, note that the above transformation can be equivalently expressed as:
In the rest of the analysis below, we …x the principal's model: S u with associated probability distribution g, the cost function c, and an approximation index ".
We now turn to an approximation lemma. For any truth and any model with an associated approximation index, pick any mechanism that contains the outside option. Using pro…t-participation pricing the principal can bound the di¤erence between the principal's expected payo¤ generated by this mechanism under her model and the expected pro…t generated by the Pro…t-Participation discounted version of her mechanism given the agent's true behavior:
Lemma 1 Consider a model (S u ; g) with an approximation index ", and let M be any menu. LetM be the menu derived through Pro…t Participation Pricing. Then for any truth (T v ; f ) satisfying the approximation index:
Proof. By the de…nition of the approximation index ", we know that there exists a partition P of the true type space T with approximation index no greater than ". Take any menu M and compute the discounted menuM . Consider any model type s and any true type that belongs to the set associated with s, namely any
Suppose that a model type s is o¤ered menu M and a true type t is o¤ered menuM . There are two possibilities: (i) t and s choose the same product; (ii) t and s choose di¤erent products.
Case (i) is straightforward. Denote the allocation chosen by both agents by (b y; p(b y)). The only loss for the principal is due to the price discount determined by :p
Focus now on case (ii). Suppose whenM is o¤ered, t chooses an allocation y 0 di¤erent from b y. Because t 2 J(s), we know that
implying that the payo¤ di¤erence between the two products cannot be much smaller for the true type than for the model type:
This does not preclude, however, that the choices of the two types are di¤erent, as assumed in (ii). Next, consider a revealed preference argument. With the original price vector p, the model type prefers b y to y 0 :
With the discounted price vector, type t prefers y 0 to b y:
By subtracting (4) from (3), we get that
By (2), the right-hand side of (5) is bounded below by 2". Given the de…nition of p, the left-hand side of (5) can also be written as:
Summing up,
There are two potential sources of loss, one due to the deviation fromŷ to y 0 , the latter due to the price discount. The loss caused by the deviation given the above inequality is
The loss due to the price discount is (recalling that pro…t is bounded above by max , which was normalized to 1),
Adding the above two inequalities together we get that
We can now see the explicit trade-o¤ between the two sources of loss: the direct-loss from discounting and the deviation-loss. By optimizing on this, we can bound their sum. In particular, if we set equal to
we getp
Taking expectations appropriately, we get the statement of the lemma
The lemma contains the main intuition for why this type of approximation scheme works. Pro…t participation puts a bound on the loss that the principal su¤ers if the type space is not what she thought it was. By o¤ering pro…t-based price discounts, the principal ensures that allocations that generate higher pro…t to her become relatively more attractive to the agent. Pro…t-Participation Pricing is in e¤ect a system of local incentives. The agent becomes a sharing residual claimant on the principal's pro…t, and now types near model types are encouraged to choose similarly high-margin allocations as the model types.
A key feature of Pro…t-Participation Pricing is that there is no guarantee that types close to a model type will choose in the same way as their respective model types. The principal still does not know how often di¤erent allocations will be chosen by the agent. In fact, the principal cannot even guarantee that, when o¤ered the discounted menu, model types will choose the allocation they were choosing previously. However, the principal knows that whichever allocation types choose with the discounted menu, the deviation from the allocation chosen by model types in the non-discounted menu cannot be very damaging to pro…t.
The existence of this bound is based on a trade-o¤ introduced by Pro…t-Participation Pricing. First, o¤ering a price discount leads to a loss to the principal proportional to . Second, the greater is the pro…t-based discount, the smaller is the potential loss that the principal might need to su¤er due to a deviation. Setting = p 2" optimizes on this trade-o¤ between the loss from lower prices and the loss from deviations and establishes the above upper bound. 9 
Pro…t Participation Mechanism
In the previous section, we did not mention optimality. The set of alternatives and the prices were not chosen with expected pro…t in mind; rather we considered any menu. We now introduce our solution concept: we combine …nding the optimal menu given the principal's model with modifying such a menu via Pro…t-Participation Pricing.
De…nition 2 The pro…t-participation mechanism (PPM) consists of the following steps:
(i) Find an optimal menuM for the screening problem de…ned by S u ; g; Y ,c;
(ii) Apply Pro…t-Participation Pricing toM to obtain a discounted menuM .
PPM takes the pricing problem described in Section 2 as its input and outputs a menuM . Our focus now is on the pro…t di¤erence comparing two scenarios: the principal's expected pro…t given the true -but unknown -optimal solution and the principal's expected pro…t if she o¤ersM to the true type space. This comparison captures the approximation loss.
Formally, let M be any menu, including, if it exists, the menu that is optimal for the true type space.
De…nition 3 For any given menu M , let the PPM loss be (T v ; f; M ) T v ; f;M . We say that the PPM loss is bounded above by a number x if it is less than x.
If there exists an optimal menu for the true type space -namely if (Y; c; T v ; f ) are such that there exists a mechanism that maximizes the principal's expected payo¤ -then the de…nition above includes the optimal menu, and the PPM loss for any menu is bounded above by the PPM loss for the optimal menu.
Note that the theorem does not require the principal to know M , nor the expected pro…t that she could achieve given this mechanism, nor the true expected pro…t given menuM :
We can now state the main result of the paper in terms of the known parameters of our setup. 9 There is an interesting connection between the proof of Lemma 1 and Theorem 21 of Balcan et al (2008) . In their set-up the principal searches for the optimal mechanism on a discretized set of prices. One of the steps in the proof consists in analyzing the e¤ect of o¤ering to the agent a discretized price vector and putting a bound on the price loss that the principal may experience because the agent chooses a di¤erent product.
Theorem 1
The PPM loss for any M is always bounded above by 4 p 2".
Proof.
Step 1. Take any menu M that contains the outside option. The associated expected payo¤ is:
where the pair y (t) ; p (y (t)) is the allocation selected by type t. The system of incentive-compatibility constraints (including, as usual, the participation constraints) is:
v (t; y (t)) p (y (t)) v (t; y) p(y) for all t 2 T and all (y; p (y)) 2 M : (10)
Both M and (T v ; M ) are unknown objects and they remain unknown in our approach.
Step 2. For the rest of the proof, …x P to be any "-approximation partition de…ned for (S u ; g) and (T v ; f ). The true approximation index is, by de…nition, not greater than ". To clarify notation, given the bijection between model types and partition cells let's index the elements of the model type set S by i 2 f1; :::; #Sg. Then for each cell J(s i ) in P , we can …nd at least one type t i 2 J(s i ) that generates a payo¤ to the principal which is at least as large as the average payo¤ for the cell:
Now, create a new model S v ; g with the following properties. Let the new type space be de…ned by S (t i ) i=1;::#S and the model payo¤ be v (t i ; y) for all i 2 f1; :::::; #Sg and for y 2 Y . Finally, let g(t i ) be such that g(t i ) = g(s i ).for all i 2 f1; :::::; #Sg Suppose that the agent's true preferences were determined by S v ; g rather than (T v ; f ). Given menu M , the system of incentive compatibility constraints are as follows: for any t i 2 S:
Since all the inequalities in the new system were already present in (10), it follows that, if (y (t) ; p (y (t))) was the allocation selected by type t 2 S T before, it still is in S v ; g .
The expected pro…t that the principal would obtain with M and S v ; g would then not be lower than (T v ; M ):
where the inequality is due to (11).
Step 3. We now apply Lemma 1 for the …rst time. The lemma applies to any truth and any model that satis…es certain conditions. For the purpose of this step, we de…ne the truth to be (S u ; g) and the model to be S v ; g : The approximation partition P used above is still obviously an approximation partition in this case and hence " is still a valid approximation index.
Let M 0 be the menu derived by Pro…t-Participation Pricing with approximation index " from M . By applying Lemma 1 given 'truth'(S u ; g) and 'model' S v ; g with approximation index ", we obtain
Step 4. However, the menu M 0 is not optimal for the model (S u ; g). Pick a menuM that is optimal for that model:
By de…nition,
Step 5. Let us apply Lemma 1 for the second time. Let the truth be (T v ; f ) and the model (S u ; g). We discountM through Pro…t-Participation Pricing to becomẽ M : The lemma guarantees that:
Summing up the above …ve steps:
and hence the pro…t-loss due to usingM instead of any menu M is bounded by:
The proof of the theorem constructs the bound to the PPM loss by applying Lemma 1 twice. In the …rst application the lemma bounds the di¤erence between the principal's expected pro…t for any menu M and the model type pro…t given any model type set satisfying the approximation index ". The second application bounds the di¤erence between the maximal model type pro…t and the true pro…t given the discounted menu identi…ed by pro…t-participation pricing given the principal's misspeci…ed model. Taken together, the two steps bound the di¤erence between the maximal pro…t and the pro…t obtained with the discounted version of the optimal model type menu.
Again, the bound is valid without requiring the principal to know anything beyond her model and the upper bound to the inaccuracy of the model: an approximation index "
Discussion
Theorem 1 o¤ers two novel lessons. First, even in a situation in which the principal is uncertain about the model, pro…t-participation o¤ers a very simple way of arriving at a menu that guarantees an expected payo¤ that is demonstrably close to the maximal expected payo¤. Second, the quality of the approximation depends on the quality of the model. As the approximation index " vanishes, the PPM solution tends to the optimal solution. The more con…dent the principal is about the quality of her model, the more she can behave as if her model was correct.
The fact that theorem 1 puts an upper bound on the loss due to model misspeci…cation has a worst-case feel, akin to strong ambiguity aversion or maximin expected utility, e.g., Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) . Hence one may wonder why the principal should be preoccupied with worst outcomes rather than average outcomes. However, we are not interested in …nding an optimal mechanism for an ambiguity-averse principal. What we …nd is a near-optimal mechanism for an expected payo¤-maximizing principal. There may be better mechanisms given additional information-a topic we discuss in section 5 -but PPM has the important property that it is asymptotically optimal: for a large class of problems the loss is guaranteed to vanish as " ! 0. Thus, the bene…t of replacing our general-purpose near-optimal mechanism with one that is more tailored to the situation at hand goes to zero in the limit. 10 If, as March and Simon (1958) argued, near optimal solution is a response to cognitive bounds, we should observe that more bounded decision-makers choose di¤erent arrangements. Within our set-up, there is a model uncertainty reducing sense in which we can perform comparative statics on cognitive.
Suppose that the principal adds model types to her existing model S S 0 .
In the context of the earlier example, this could be the case for example when the principal chooses to interview another type at an unexplored location at some sampling cost , and add this type's preferences to her model. It follows form the de…nition that the new approximation index is " (ii) decreases (the principal prices alternatives with higher actual pro…t margins hence less magnanimously).
As model uncertainty rises, a principal who uses PPM to solve our problem, will use mechanisms that are simpler, as measured in the number of distinct items o¤ered to the agent. Such simpler menus will be derived from mechanisms that employ rougher categorizations of true types into approximate types and o¤er items at greater discounts relative to the prices optimal for the approximate type space. 10 There might appear to be a relation between our model uncertainty interpretation and the quantal response equilibrium of McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) . We can imagine that the model used by our principal excludes some dimensions of the agent's type. This means that, as in a quantal-response equilibrium, if we take the model at face value, we still have some unexplained variability in the agent's choice. However, there are two crucial di¤erences. First, while quantalresponse equilibria operate by perturbing the players' strategies, our agent instead always plays best response. Second, quantal-response equilibrium postulates a particular form of perturbation, while our principal may not have such information.
Outside of the problem of model uncertainty, by imposing some minimal structure on the true type space -Lipschitz continuity of the agent's utility in his type -PPM can also help reduce the complexity of contracting. Conitzer and Sandholm ( Theorem 1, 2004) show that …nding an exact solution to the single-agent mechanism design problem we consider here is NP-complete. Our result suggests a simple way of …nding an approximate solution. Partition the agent type space by using a regular grid: the approximation index is then given by the maximal cell size. Select the preferences of any single type from the cell to be its representative type. Then using this sparse and misspeci…ed model, obtain a bound to the approximation loss by using Theorem 1.This way, the principal uses a much simpler albeit wrong model, which if used naively might generate discontinuous losses, but which under pro…t-participation allows for a simple trade-o¤ between approximation loss and how complex the model need to be to general robust revenue. 11 
Alternative Mechanisms
As we have shown, PPM is a valid approximation scheme, but are there other approximation schemes that perform equally well or perhaps better? To address this question, we …rst have to note that the performance of any approximation scheme depends on the class of problems to which it is applied. According to the No Free Lunch Theorem of Optimization, elevated performance over one class of problems tends to be o¤set by performance over another class (Wolpert and Macready 1997) . The more prior information the principal has, the more tailored the mechanism can be. For more restrictive classes of problems (e.g. one-dimensional problems with the standard regularity conditions), it is easy to think of mechanisms that perform better than PPM. Given model uncertainty, a more pertinent question is whether there are other valid mechanisms for the general class of problems we consider.
Since our results apply to a large class of multi-dimensional screening problems, de…ned only by the approximation index ", we shall now ask whether there are other mechanisms, besides PPM, that work for this class of problems. We begin by de…ning the class of mechanisms that are based on the principal's model and modify prices given the optimal solution of this model:
De…nition 4 A mechanism is model-based if it can be represented as a two-step process where …rst one performs step (i) of the PPM and then, modi…es the price vector p(y) according to some functioñ p(y) = (p(y); c(y); ") : The function obviously does not operate on the price of the outside option y 0 , which is a primitive of the problem. We focus our attention on mechanisms that return minimal exact solutions, namely solutions where all alternatives o¤ered are bought with positive probability.
The function can encompass a number of mechanisms. In the naive one, the principal takes the model seriously tout court, without modifying prices.
Example 1 In the naive mechanism, (p(y); c(y); ") = p(y):
In the ‡at discount mechanism, the principal acts magnanimously by discounting prices, but her generosity is not related to model pro…ts:
Example 2 In the ‡at discount mechanism (p(y); c(y); ") = p(y) ;
for some > 0, which may depend on ".
Finally, we can also represent the PPM in this notation:
The following de…nition is aimed at distinguishing between mechanisms depending on whether they contain an element of pro…t participation or not. Under pro…t participation the principal shares her pro…ts and hence her price discount that is strictly increasing in her pro…t. Pro…t participation is violated when there is a price/cost region including the origin where an increase in the principal's pro…t does not translate into a strict increase in the absolute value of the price discount.
The pro…t-participation condition is strong for two reasons: pro…t participation fails if a weak inequality is violated; it fails if the inequality is violated for some prices and cost levels, not necessarily all prices and cost levels. As our theorem is negative, a strong condition means that we can exclude a larger class of mechanisms.
It is easy to see that both the naive price mechanism and the ‡at-discount mechanism violate pro…t participation ( and by construction, PPM never violates pro…t participation. We now show that a model-based mechanism that violates pro…t participation cannot be a valid approximation: Theorem 2 Suppose the agent's preferences are at least two-dimensional. The upper bound to the pro…t loss generated by a model-based mechanism that violates pro…t participation does not vanish as " ! 0:
Proof. Suppose that the mechanism is model-based but violates pro…t participation for some p > 0 and c > 0. Select
Suppose that c = 0. For the p 0 and p 00 chosen above it must be that:
De…ne h = p 0 and q = p 00 p 0 . Consider the following problem:
In this screening problem, types below t = 1 prefer a "generic" alternative y. Types above t = 1 prefer a "personalized"alternative y = t.
It is easy to see that in the optimal solution of this screening problem types below 1 buy y at price h and each type t > 1 is o¤ered a personalized alternativê y (t) = t at price h + q (t 1). The principal's expected pro…t is h + 1 4 q. To show that the mechanism does not yield a valid approximation, we consider the following sequence of models (S k ; u k ; g k ) where S k T and u k (s; y) = v(s; y) for all k: sets with associated stereotype probability distributions:
If he buys y he gets utility h (h; 0; " n ) He choosesŷ (s) only if q (t 1 2 js tj) (h + q(s 1); 0; " n ) (h; 0; " n ) which, if one subtracts (13) from it, implies: q (t 1 2 js tj) q (s 1) 0;
which can be re-written as t s 2 js tj ;
which is always false. Hence, all types that are not model types choose y rather than a nearby personalized alternative. For any S n , the expected pro…t of the principal if she uses is h. Hence, the limit of the pro…t as n ! 1 (" n ! 0) is still h, which is strictly lower than the pro…t with the maximal pro…t with the true type, which, as we saw above, is h + q 2 .
The proof of the above Theorem 2 proceeds by constructing a straightforward class of problems with binding non-local constraints. In particular, we assume that the product space includes a generic inferior product and a continuum of typespeci…c products. In the optimal solution, a non-zero measure of types face a binding incentive-compatibility constraint between a personalized alternative and the generic alternative. Hence, all types nearby a model type strictly prefer the generic alternative to the model type's optimal allocation. This creates a nonvanishing loss for the principal.
The intuition behind the Theorem has to do with the knife-edge nature of mechanisms that do not include pro…t participation. In the exact solution of the principal's model there is a binding constraint (IC or PC) for every alternative o¤ered. The pro…t-participation mechanism -and analogous schemes -relax these constraints in the right direction. They add slack to constraints that ensures that the agent does not choose alternatives with a lower pro…t. Mechanisms without pro…t-participation return a price vector that still displays binding constraints -or don't even satisfy those constraints. When pro…t participation is violated types near a model type might choose di¤erent pro…t-margin allocations. If only local constraints are binding, the magnitude of such misallocations vanishes as " ! 0. In multi-dimensional screening problems, however, non-local constraints will typically bind in optimum. Here, the magnitude of the misallocation does not vanish even as " ! 0.
As one would expect, the theorem does not apply if the type space is onedimensional. For instance, in the Mussa and Rosen's (1978) set-up, the naive mechanism is a valid approximation: only local IC constraints are binding and deviations are guaranteed to get smaller as the model type space becomes …ner. As we argued in the introduction though, most economically relevant screening problems are likely to be multi-dimensional and hence Theorem 2 provides useful general guidance.
Given the nature of the statement, the proof is by example. One may object that the class of problems used in the proof has zero measure within the set of all possible screening problems. However, all we need is a class of problems where non-local constraints are binding in optimum for a positive measure of types. As binding non-local constraints are an endemic feature of multi-dimensional screening problems Choné 1998, Rochet and Stole 2003) , endless other examples could be found in which the optimal solution is not robust to small perturbation of the agent's preferences.
Theorem 2 says that if a mechanism performs at least as well as PPM, it must be either very similar to PPM in that it relies on pro…t participation, or very di¤erent in that it is not even model based. Hence, the theorem points to three interesting questions that we leave for future research. Are there other pro…t-participation mechanisms that perform better than PPM? Are there non-model based mechanisms that perform better than PPM? Are there not-overly-restrictive classes of screening problems where the Naive Mechanism is guaranteed to be a valid approximation?
Conclusion
We consider a principal who faces a screening problem but faces model uncertainty and operates on a potentially misspeci…ed model of the agent's behavior We characterize the upper bound to the expected loss that the principal incurs if she uses the pro…t-participation mechanism. We show that this loss vanishes smoothly as the model type space tends to the true one. We also prove that this is not true for similar model-based mechanisms that do not contain a pro…t participation element.
The economic insight of this paper is that a principal who operates on the basis of only an approximate type space cannot just ignore the misspeci…cation error, but she can …nd a simple and economically intuitive way to limit the damage. It would be interesting to know whether this insight holds beyond our set-up. A strength of our approach is that it does not make speci…c functional or distributional assumptions and applies to settings where the potential allocation space is very large.
Our analysis has a number of limitations that future research could address. First, we assume that the principal's cost depends only on the product characteristics, but not on the type of the agent (as in insurance problems). Second, we assume that there is only one agent (or a continuum thereof). It would be interesting to extend the analysis and explore the role of pro…t-participation in implementing near-optimal social choice correspondences in environments with multiple agents, perhaps linking it to notions of robustness to small perturbations in such contexts (Meyer-ter-Vehn and Morris 2011). Third, one could explore environments where payo¤s are not quasilinear.
